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THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY 
IN BRAZILIAN LAW 
Alexandre dos Santos Cunha*
INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that rights serve a social function was first introduced into 
Brazilian legal culture about a century ago.  Although the concept is 
historically linked to the French scholar Léon Duguit, the Brazilian version 
is distinct and does not share these French origins.  Twentieth-century 
Italian jurists Pietro Cogliolo and Enrico Cimbali, who both exerted 
overwhelming influence over the so-called “Renovators” of Brazilian 
Private Law, are primarily responsible for Brazil’s version.1  Unlike Duguit, 
Cogliolo and Cimbali construed the concept of a social function as a 
justification for imposing only external limits on the exercise of rights.2
The concept of the social function of rights first appeared in the Brazilian 
Constitution in 1934, and has become considerably stronger since the 
country adopted a new Civil Code in 2002.  This Essay focuses on the 2002 
Code’s impact on the way jurists and courts understand the concept, 
especially with respect to the social function of property.  This Essay is 
divided into four parts.  Part I presents a brief history of Brazilian property 
law, Part II discusses the social function of property as a legal principle, 
Part III discusses it as a structural element of property, and Part IV 
discusses it as a structural element of rights. 
  
Consequently, Brazilian courts have never considered Duguit’s 
understanding of the social function of property as a source of internal 
limitations. 
 
*  J.D., LL.M., S.J.D (Federal University of the State of Rio Grande do Sul—UFRGS, Porto 
Alegre, Brazil), Researcher at the National Institute for Applied Economic Research—IPEA, 
Brasília, Brazil.  This Essay was originally translated from Brazilian Portuguese by Andrei 
dos Santos Cunha. 
 1. Cogliolo’s most influential work was his book Filosofia del Diritto Privato (The 
Philosophy of Private Law), published in 1912.  Cimbali’s most influential work was his 
book Nuova fase del Diritto Civile nei rapporti economici e sociali (The Transformation of 
Civil Law in Economic and Social Relations), published in 1907. 
 2. Judith Hofmeister Martins-Costa, Reflexões Sobre o Princípio da Função Social dos 
Contratos, in O DIREITO DA EMPRESA E DAS OBRIGAÇÕES E O NOVO CÓDIGO CIVIL 
BRASILEIRO 218, 218–48 (Alexandre dos Santos Cunha coord., 2006).  Cogliolo and 
Cimbali’s understanding developed from the ideas of German jurist Otto von Gierke. See id. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN PROPERTY LAW 
Portugal’s occupation of Brazil is a unique episode in the history of the 
European colonization of the Americas.  Unlike Spain, Portugal applied a 
model of absolute centralized administration to her newly acquired 
territories, instead of promoting colonial institutions.  The colonies utilized 
the same political, administrative, and judicial organization and the same 
legal norms—especially the Ordenações do Reino (the Kingdom’s Legal 
Rules)—as the metropolitan territories.  Brazil and Portugal’s legal 
professionals were educated at Coimbra University in Portugal.3  Indeed, 
the Portuguese Crown considered the Brazilian territory as integral a part of 
its property as the Moorish territories that the Kingdom had reclaimed in 
the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. 
As a result, the colonization of Brazil followed the same pattern of 
development that Portugal followed in the fourteenth century.4  The Crown 
employed the sesmaria—a system of land management first used under 
Ferdinand I in 1375—to distribute property among private entrepreneurs 
and to promote colonization.5  Because the land remained public property, 
we might describe the sesmaria in modern legal terminology as a kind of 
gratuitous concession of the right to use the land, subject to a series of 
conditions such as limiting the land’s occupation and restricting its use to 
certain stipulated economic activities.6  The sesmaria could be transferred 
by contract or through inheritance, but restrictions on the right of use could 
not be altered.  The Crown could reclaim the land if one failed to observe 
these conditions.  Beginning in 1534, Portugal promoted the occupation of 
Brazilian territory through sesmarias, and by the time Brazil gained its 
independence between 1821 and 1824, it had distributed all land near the 
coast.7  The Brazilian sesmarias closely resembled those distributed in 
southern Portugal:  they were attached to large tracts of land, concentrated 
in the hands of a small group of latifundium estate landowners, employed 
intensive slave labor, and specialized in cultivating monoculture crops for 
export. 
The unique process that led to Brazil’s independence meant that any 
changes from the Portuguese legal system developed extremely slowly, 
 
 3. LUIS WECKMANN, LA HERENCIA MEDIEVAL DEL BRASIL 81–105, 236–49 (1993). 
 4. See Luiz Antonio Ferraro Júnior & Marcel Bursztyn, Das Sesmarias à Resistência 
ao Cercamento:  razões históricas dos Fundos de Pasto, 23 CADERNO CRH 385, 387 (2010) 
(Braz.). 
 5. WECKMANN, supra note 3, at 106–15. 
 6. LAURA BECK VARELA, DAS SESMARIAS À PROPRIEDADE MODERNA:  UM ESTUDO DE 
HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO (2005). 
 7. RAYMUNDO FAORO, OS DONOS DO PODER:  FORMAÇÃO DO PATRONATO POLÍTICO 
BRASILEIRO (1958).  Brazil’s independence was a peculiar affair.  After Napoleon invaded 
Portugal in 1807, the Portuguese Royal Court was forced to move from Lisbon to Rio de 
Janeiro.  This promoted Brazil from a mere colony to a formal part of the United Kingdom 
of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves.  When King John VI returned to Lisbon in 1821, it was 
determined that the Crown Prince of Portugal would continue to rule Brazil.  After a long 
series of quarrels with the Portuguese Parliament in Lisbon, however, the Crown Prince 
arranged to be crowned Brazil’s first Emperor in 1822. 
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especially in the domain of Private Law.8  Although the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1824, which created the new Brazilian Empire, stipulated 
that a Civil Code would be written,9 a lack of consensus prevented the 
drafting of a definite version.  And while nineteenth-century efforts to 
codify a Private Law statute did result in the creation of some important 
documents,10
However, adopting norms concerning land disputes could not wait for the 
vicissitudes of codification.  With independence came the dissolution of the 
sesmaria system, leaving Brazil with no legal instrument governing land 
appropriation.  This made it extremely difficult to promote agrarian frontier 
expansion and to grant rural credit in the absence of reliable collateral.  
Thus, in 1850, the Brazilian Parliament approved Imperial Law No. 601,
 the first Brazilian Civil Code was not adopted until 1916, 
twenty-seven years after the formation of the Brazilian Republic in 1889.  
Thus, the Ordenações Filipinas, decreed by King Philip II of Portugal and 
Spain in 1603, remained in effect in Brazilian territory until 1917, fifty 
years after they had been revoked in Portugal. 
11
The Land Statute created private property in Brazil for the first time.  The 
statute mirrored the Continental Law’s definition of the concept of 
dominium by treating private property as an individual and absolute right.  
It converted sesmaria rights holders into landowners of the estates they 
already held, and extended the same ownership rights to anyone who 
possessed public land for at least 100 years before the statute’s passage.  In 
this way, the statute perpetuated the concentration of rural property in the 
hands of the same few who held the land in colonial times, effectively 
blocking the distribution of land to the European and Japanese immigrants 
who came to Brazil after independence. 
 
popularly known as the Lei de Terras (Land Statute), along with other 
attempts at structural economic reform aimed at preparing the country for 
the gradual abolition of slavery. 
The Land Statute had no social concerns.  Its main aim, successfully 
achieved, was preventing immigrants and former slaves from becoming 
landowners.  Rather than promoting the settlement of new families in rural 
 
 8. Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, O Ensino Jurídico e o Processo Codificatório Civil 
Brasileiro, DIREITO EM REVISTA, May 2002, at 43 (Braz.). 
 9. CONSTITUICÂO POLITICA DO IMPERIO DO BRAZIL (1824) art. 179(XVIII). 
 10. The most important of the many code projects proposed during the Empire was the 
Esboço de Código Civil Brasileiro (A Draft Civil Code of Brazil), written by Augusto 
Teixeira de Freitas, a follower of Savigny and the Historical School, between 1857 and 
1866.  Although the Empire never adopted it, Freitas’s text strongly influenced the Civil 
Codes of Argentina, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  Particularly remarkable is that the 
Esboço’s assumptions were markedly different from the mainstream paradigms of the time, 
especially those established by the Code Napoléon and the Código Civil de Chile, and was 
three decades ahead of the model that would finally be adopted by the Buergerliches 
Gesetzbuch.  To a certain extent, the Esboço also heralded the strong influence German 
thought would have over Brazilian legal doctrine throughout that country’s history. Cf. 
Cunha, supra note 8. 
 11. Lei No. 601, de 18 de Setembro de 1850, COL. LEIS IMPERIO BRASIL, tomo 11, pt.1: 
307. 
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areas and redistributing land, it deliberately inflated property values by 
creating a scarcity of estate deeds.  In transforming rural estates into 
commodities, it created a substitute for slave ownership to deal with 
problems of capital immobilization, value reservation, and provision of debt 
collateral.12
The 1916 Civil Code made only one substantial modification to the 
former Empire’s Land Statute system.  To strengthen the dominium deeds 
against alternative, informal modes of land appropriation or possession, 
publicly notarized registration of real estate—which the Lei Hipotecária 
(Mortgage Statute) originally authorized in 1864
  At the same time, the dominium concept authorized changes to 
the original use restrictions on the sesmaria grant.  The ability to alter the 
land’s use was essential to the diversification of the Brazilian economy 
from primarily sugar exports to the production of coffee, cotton, and rubber. 
13
The draft Civil Code originally contained an innovative limitation on the 
exercise of property rights by providing that “[t]his statute protects, within 
the limits of the law, the owner’s right to make whatever use he sees fit of 
his property, and to claim this property, in the case of corporeal goods, from 
those who unlawfully possess it.”
—became compulsory.  
This introduced Brazil to the recording of deeds at a real estate registration, 
a mode of dominium acquisition borrowed from German Private Law. 
14  However, the Federal Parliament 
omitted this text from the final version, which simply provided that “[t]his 
law assures to the owner the right to use, enjoy and dispose of his property, 
and to recover it from the power of whoever unjustly possesses it.”15
II.  THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY APPLIED AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE 
 
Although the draft Code of 1916 did not expressly introduce the concept 
of a social function of property, its author, Clovis Bevilaqua, understood it 
as expressing that principle.  In Bevilaqua’s words, property rights must be 
subjected to “restrictions determined by considerations of social order,” 
which is why “modern Codes are leaning toward finding a balance between 
the individual’s interest and that of society.”16  The balance does not spring 
from an individual’s action, but rather from the statutory law, which 
“expresses the conditions of social life, at each moment.”17
 
 12. See generally ZÉLIA MARIA CARDOSO DE MELLO, METAMORFOSES DA RIQUEZA, SÃO 
PAULO, 1845-1895:  CONTRIBUIÇÃO AO ESTUDO DA PASSAGEM DA ECONOMIA MERCANTIL-
ESCRAVISTA À ECONOMIA EXPORTADORA CAPITALISTA (1990). 
 
 13. Lei No. 1237, de 24 de Setembro de 1864, COL. LEIS IMPERIO BRASIL, tomo 24, pt.1: 
69. 
 14. “A lei assegura ao proprietario, dentro dos limites por ella traçados, o direito de 
utilizar-se de seus bens, como entender e de reivildical-os, quando corporeos, do poder de 
quem, injustamente, os possua.” 1 CLOVIS BEVILAQUA, DIREITO DAS COISAS 134 (1941). 
 15. “A lei assegura ao proprietário o direito de usar, gozar e dispor de seus bens, e de 
reave-los do poder de quem quer que injustamente os possua.” CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (1916) 
art. 524 (Braz.). 
 16. 1 BEVILAQUA, supra note 14, at 134. 
 17. Id. 
2011] THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY IN BRAZIL 1175 
In the same vein as other “Renovators” of Brazilian Private Law, 
Bevilaqua perceived the social function of property as a legal principle that 
was likely to justify external limitations on property rights imposed by 
statutory law.  In the Renovators’ view, “the rights and restrictions belong 
to separate dimensions; the restrictions are always seen as ‘disadvantages,’ 
externally imposed upon the rights; the scope of protection of a right is 
wider than what it effectively ensures, because, upon unrestricted rights, 
limits are imposed that reduce the initial scope of protection.”18
Because the Federal Parliament omitted it from the 1916 Civil Code, the 
social function of property remained a mere legal principle until the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1934 established it as a constitutional principle.  
In its bill of individual rights, the Constitution established that “the right of 
property is protected, provided it is not exerted against any social or 
collective interests, in the forms determined by the law.”
 
19  According to 
Brazilian legal doctrine, the idea of “any social or collective interests” 
encompasses the concept of a social function of property; it thus acquires 
constitutional status and may be put into effect according to “the forms 
determined by the law.”20  In other words, social function becomes an 
external limitation that the government must impose on the exercise of 
property rights.21  Pursuant to this authorization, limitations were enacted in 
normative instruments of urban policy, such as the Lei de Loteamento para 
Venda de Terrenos em Prestações22 (Statute Concerning the Plotting of 
Land to be Sold in Installments) and the Estatuto da Cidade23
 
 18. Martins-Costa, supra note 
 (City 
Statute), as well as legislation concerning agrarian policy, such as the 
2, at 232. 
 19. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DO BRASIL (1934) art. 113.17. 
 20. Id. 
 21. All Brazilian Constitutions since 1934 have, more or less explicitly, made room for 
the social function of property.  The 1937 text established the authoritarian regime of the 
Estado Novo, which stipulated that “the nature and limits [of property rights] shall be 
defined by the laws which regulate its use.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DOS ESTADOS 
UNIDOS DO BRASIL (1937) art. 122(XIV) (Interdepartmental Comm. on Cooperation with the 
Am. Republics trans., 1939).  When Brazil became a democracy again, the 1946 Constitution 
stated that “the use of property shall be conditioned upon social welfare.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DOS 
ESTADOS UNIDOS DO BRASIL (1946) art. 147 (A.J. Peaslee trans., 1950).  During the Military 
Dictatorship, the 1967 Constitution determined that “[i]t is the purpose of the economic and 
social order to achieve social justice, on the basis of the following principles:  . . . The social 
function of property.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DO BRASIL (1967) art. 157(III) (A.J. Peaslee trans., 
1967).  The current Constitution states that “property shall observe its social function.” 
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 5(XXIII) (Official Senate 
translation). 
 22. Decreto No. 58, de 10 de Dezembro de 1937, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
13.12.1937 (Braz.).  For more about the Lei de Loteamento para Venda de Terrenos em 
Prestações as a normative instrument of urban policy, see Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, 
Informal Land Subdivision and Real Estate Regularization:  A Comparative Study Between 
Colombia and Brazil, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 315 (2009). 
 23. Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
11.7.2001 (Braz.). 
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Estatuto da Terra24 (Land Statute) and the Lei da Reforma Agrária25
An analysis of Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court) 
(STF) precedent clearly demonstrates that Brazil adopted this interpretation 




The City Statute established general guidelines concerning urban law and 
policies that must be observed by municipalities.
  A 
simple query of STF court decisions interpreting this clause over the last 
five years returned thirty related opinions, which analyze its application in 
four different contexts:  (1) the constitutionality of judicial instruments 
created by the City Statute; (2) the progressive taxation on urban property; 
(3) the expropriation of condominium land for land reform; and (4) the 
determination of the rights of the occupants of public land. 
27  The statute also 
provided for the “onerous concession of the right to build” (outorga 
onerosa do direito de construir), a mechanism by which the municipality 
can force an individual to pay for any construction that exceeds the surface 
area of his or her own land.28  In Koerich Participações Administração e 
Construção LTDA v. Município de Florianópolis29 (Koerich Inc. v. County 
of Florianopolis), the STF held that this is “an instrument directed at the 
correction of distortions brought about by unruly urban growth, at the 
promotion of the full development of the functions of the city, and at the 
application of the principle of the social function of property.”30
The same understanding permeates the debate over the progressive 
taxation of urban real estate.  The 1988 Constitution required that 
municipalities tax urban real estate.
  Therefore, 
it is an external limit imposed by a city’s Urban Development Plan and 
authorized by the social function principle. 
31  “[I]n order to ensure achievement of 
the social function of property,” such taxes should be graduated.32
 
 24. Lei No. 4.504, de 30 de Novembro de 1964, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
30.11.1964 (Braz.). 
  In Melo 
 25. Lei No. 8.629, de 25 de Fevereiro de 1993, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
26.2.1993 (Braz.). 
 26. See supra note 21 (explaining that each Brazilian constitution has incorporated a 
social function of property clause).  The STF was created by the 1891 Constitution, which 
also founded the republican regime and the federal system in Brazil.  Throughout its history, 
the STF performed functions similar to those of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Since the adoption 
of the 1988 Constitution, it has become closer in character to European constitutional courts, 
but retains its status as the highest court of the Judicial Branch. 
 27. See Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
11.7.2001 (Braz.). 
 28. See id.  The payment may be in money, land, work, or services. See id. 
 29. S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinário No. 387.047, Relator:  Min. Eros Grau, 06.03.2008, 
2317, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 02.05.2008, 
799 (Braz.). 
 30. Id. at 804. 
 31. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 156 (Official 
Senate translation). 
 32. Id. ¶ 1. 
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v. Municipio de Belo Horizonte33 (Melo v. County of Belo Horizonte), the 
STF severely curtailed the municipal power to levy such taxes.  The STF 
held that while such taxes may be graduated in time, the municipalities 
could not base the tax rate on the real estate’s use or value.34  This decision 
spurred a political movement in support of municipalities that culminated in 
the passage of the Twenty-ninth Constitutional Amendment, which 
enlarged municipal taxing power.35  Despite this development, the STF 
continues to strictly control property tax legislation through its 
interpretations of the social function principle.36
III.  THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY APPLIED 
AS A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF PROPERTY 
 
A survey of STF decisions over the last five years reveals that there are 
other, more exotic interpretations of the social function of property.  In 
Estácio de Souza Leão Filho v. Presidente da República37 (Estácio de 
Souza Leão Filho v. President of the Republic), Rafaeli e outro v. 
Presidente da República38 (Rafaeli et al. v. President of the Republic), and 
Siqueira e outro v. Presidente da República39
It is within the power of the Union to expropriate on account of social 
interest, for purposes of agrarian reform, the rural property which is not 
performing its social function, against prior and fair compensation in 
agrarian debt bonds with a clause providing for maintenance of the real 
value, redeemable within a period of up to twenty years computed as from 
 (Siqueira et al. v. President 
of the Republic), the STF deemed it necessary to determine whether the 
social function of property is a structural element of property rights 
themselves or the land to which the rights belong.  The three cases were 
fairly similar.  The plaintiffs, owners of condominium lands in rural areas, 
were attempting to annul a presidential act expropriating the estate for land 
reform.  According to the 1988 Constitution: 
 
 33. S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinário No. 153.771, Relator:  Min. Moreira Alves, 
20.11.1996, 1881, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 
05.09.1997, 496 (Braz.). 
 34. Id. at 572. 
 35. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) amend. XXIX (Official 
Senate translation). 
 36. The most recent case on the matter is Gasparin v. Município de Curitiba (Gasparin 
v. County of Curitiba), S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinário No. 595.080, Relator:  Min. Joaquim 
Barbosa, 31.08.2010, 2417, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO 
[S.T.F.J.e.], 01.10.2010, 1299 (Braz.). 
 37. S.T.F., Mandado de Segurança No. 24.573, Relator:  Min. Eros Grau, 12.06.2006, 
2260, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 15.12.2006, 
160 (Braz.). 
 38. S.T.F., Mandado de Segurança No. 25.299, Relator:  Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, 
14.06.2006, 2246, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 
08.09.2006, 178 (Braz.). 
 39. S.T.F. Mandado de Segurança No. 26.129, Relator:  Min. Eros Grau, 14.06.2007, 
2286, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 24.08.2007, 
563 (Braz.). 
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the second year of issue, and the use of which shall be defined in the 
law.40
The Constitution further specifies: 
 
The social function is met when the rural property complies 
simultaneously with, according to the criteria and standards prescribed by 
law, the following requirements: 
(I) rational and adequate use; 
(II) adequate use of available natural resources and preservation of the 
environment; 
(III) compliance with the provisions that regulate labour relations; 
(IV) exploitation that favours the well-being of the owners and 
labourers.41
On the other hand, “[e]xpropriation of the following for agrarian reform 
purposes is not permitted:  (I) small and medium-size rural property, as 




In all three cases, the act of expropriation was imposed upon rural estates 
that were not following the constitutional principle of “rational and 
adequate use”:  they did not reach the “degree of land use” nor the “degree 
of efficiency in the exploitation” of land required by the Land Reform 
Statute.  Although the plaintiffs’ estates fell into the category of large-size 
rural property, they all belonged to more than one owner in a condominium 
regime.
 
43  Each individual owner’s share would only constitute a small or 
medium-size rural property and thus could not be expropriated for land 
reform.44
From a Private Law perspective, these were easy cases.  Brazilian 
statutes, like their counterparts in many civil law systems, do not provide 
for the coexistence of property rights on one parcel of land.  When a piece 
of property is held in condominium, it has only one property right that is 
exercised simultaneously by multiple individuals.  As they share this single 
right, they must exercise it in conformity with its social function.  If they do 
not, the state may expropriate the estate. 
  For this reason, the owners asked the STF to pronounce that the 
act of expropriation was abusive. 
However, this debate took a totally different direction when argued 
before a court with only one Private Law specialist.  The STF justices split 
into two groups.  The dissenters favored the plaintiffs and argued that, in 
the case of multiple owners, the ratio between the total area and the number 
 
 40. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 184 (Official 
Senate translation). 
 41. Id. art. 186. 
 42. Id. art. 185. 
 43. Estácio de Souza Leão Filho v. Presidente da República, S.T.F., Mandado de 
Segurança No. 24.573, Relator:  Min. Eros Grau, 12.06.2006, 2260, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL 
FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 15.12.2006, 160, 162–64 (Braz.). 
 44. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988) art. 185 (Official 
Senate translation). 
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of condominium participants must factor into the land’s categorization as 
small, medium, or large-size rural estates.45  The majority argued that the 
social function is an attribute of the property itself, not of its owners or their 
property rights.46
IV.  THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY APPLIED 
AS A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF RIGHTS 
  Thus, one must consider only whether the land conforms 
with its social function. 
Debate concerning the convenience and necessity of a new Brazilian 
Civil Code started as early as the 1940s, during World War II.  In 1969, the 
Ministry of Justice appointed a group of seven jurists, led by Miguel Reale, 
to write a draft.  Their draft was sent to Parliament in 1975, approved by the 
Lower House in 1984, by the Senate in 2001, and finally promulgated in 
2002.47
Despite being created in the 1970s under the aegis of a right-wing 
military dictatorship whose economic policies favored social exclusion and 
income concentration, the 2002 Code is surprisingly socially oriented.  
Because Reale came from the integralista movement (the Brazilian 
equivalent of Catholic authoritarianism), he had a tendency toward 
communitarian thinking.  He believed that “[e]ven though socialism has not 
triumphed, sociality has, and collective values must prevail over individual 
ones, without the loss, however, of the founding value of the human 
person.”
 
48  Therefore, a “social sense is one of the most remarkable traits of 
the draft, in contrast with the individualism conditioning the [1916] Civil 
Code.”49
One way the 2002 Civil Code expresses this “social sense” is its 
provision for “a new concept of property, based upon the constitutional 
principle that the function of property must be social, [that] overcomes the 
interpretation according to which . . . property is an exclusive function of 




 45. Estácio de Souza Leão Filho, 2260 S.T.F.J.e. at 165–71. 
  Although Reale 
mentions the “constitutional principle” of the social function of property to 
justify the legal imposition of limits on property rights, he is not among 
those jurists who view the social function merely as an authorization to 
impose external limits on those rights.  Rather, he thinks that “the rights and 
 46. Id. at 177–87.  The decision was reached by a vote of five to four.  The majority 
justices were Sepulveda Pertence (appointed by President Sarney in 1989), Cezar Peluso 
(appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2003), Carlos Britto (appointed by President Lula 
da Silva in 2003), Joaquim Barbosa (appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2003), and Eros 
Grau (appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2004).  The dissenting justices were Celso de 
Mello (appointed by President Sarney in 1989), Marco Aurelio (appointed by President 
Collor in 1990), Ellen Gracie (appointed by President Cardoso in 2000), and Gilmar Mendes 
(appointed by President Cardoso in 2002). 
 47. For a comprehensive history of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code, see MIGUEL REALE, O 
PROJETO DO NOVO CÓDIGO CIVIL (2d ed. 1999). 
 48. Id. at 7. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 6. 
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the respective limits are immanent to any legal position; the definitive 
contents of rights are, precisely, the contents resulting from this 
understanding of rights ‘being born’ with limitations; therefore, the scope of 
protection of a right is the scope of the effective guarantees this right 
provides.”51
 The right of property must be exercised in accordance with its 
economic, social and environmental ends, so that the flora, fauna and 
natural beauties are preserved, as well as the ecological equilibrium and 
the historical and artistic patrimonies, and so that air and water pollution 
are averted, in obedience of the rules established by specific legislation.
  This new understanding permeates the text of Article 1228 of 
the 2002 Civil Code, whose first paragraph reads: 
52
Thus, the 2002 Civil Code broke with mainstream Brazilian legal thought 
by linking the exercise of property rights to economic, social, and 
environmental ends.  The Code internalizes the social function of property 
by imposing a duty of solidarity upon the owner.  
 
Although Reale’s conception approaches Duguit’s original theory, the 
social function of property still risks being misunderstood by justice 
professionals.  STF precedents determining the rights of public land 
occupants illustrate this risk.  For example, in União v. Juíza Federal da 
Vara Ambiental, Agrária e Residual de Curitiba53 (Federal Government v. 
Federal Environmental & Agrarian Court of Curitiba), squatters had 
occupied public land since 1951 and had made significant investments to 
make the land productive.  Brazilian legislation since the 1850 Land 
Statute, however, prohibited individuals from acquiring ownership of public 
land through adverse possession; it can only be sold or donated pursuant to 
government settlement programs or land reforms.  Yet, because the 
squatters in Curitiba had given the occupied land a social function, while 
the Brazilian Union had done nothing to improve its use, Justice Ricardo 
Lewandowski argued in dissent that they should at least be compensated for 
their expenses.54  The majority did not agree and held that the squatters had 
not obtained any right to the public land they occupied, nor any right to 
compensation for their investments.55
 
 51. See Martins-Costa, supra note 
  Because the STF historically 
interpreted the social function of property as a source of state-imposed 
external limitations on property rights, it was very difficult for the justices 
to understand that, as an internal limitation, it should apply to the Brazilian 
Union in the same way it applies to private owners. 
2, at 232. 
 52. C.C. (2002) art. 1228 § 1 (Braz.). 
 53. S.T.F., Reclamação No. 3.437, Relator:  Min. Carlos Britto, 18.10.2007, 2417, 
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA ELECTRÔNICO [S.T.F.J.e.], 02.05.2008, 316 
(Braz.). 
 54. Id. at 336–38. 
 55. Id. at 318–32. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having been imported as a legal principle in the beginning of the 
twentieth century and codified some seventy years ago, the social function 
of property is not only well known and acknowledged by both legal 
professionals and the general public in Brazil, but is also a structural 
element of that country’s legal order.  Nevertheless, the Brazilian 
experience shows that certain legal models, like some wines, do not travel 
well.  Even though the 2002 Civil Code finally adopted theoretical 
postulates similar to Duguit’s original proposals, Brazil’s original 
misunderstanding of this idea has seriously biased the local legal 
environment and hindered its application in accordance with the original 
French formulation and the Code authors’ intent.  It is probable that this 
tension will result in an important dispute over the proper meaning of the 
concept and, despite the efforts of some groups of thinkers, it is difficult to 
say whether Brazil will embrace the French understanding.  If it does not, 
Brazilian law may forever remain a prisoner of exotic conceptions of the 
social function of property. 
Given this context, the question remains whether there is any value in 
transplanting legal concepts.  If another solution to the problem of land 
concentration and the abusive use of property had been adopted, perhaps a 
model closer to Brazil’s national tradition, it may have obtained similar or 
even better results than the social function of property.  It is possible that an 
authentically Brazilian solution might have been more adequate—or at least 
more easily understood by its legal professionals. 
 
